The self-limiting revolutions of 1989 in Central Europe offer an alternative paradigm of revolutionary change that is reminiscent more of the American struggle for independence in 1776 than the Jacobin tendencies that grew out of the French Revolution of 1789. In order to understand the contradictory impulses of the revolutions of 1989-the desire for a radical renewal and the concern for preservation-this article takes as its point of departure the political thought of Hannah Arendt and Edmund Burke.
Hence, I will argue that the events of 1989 are best understood as self-limiting conservative revolutions in the Burkean sense. This concept is clearly based on an oxymoron: one cannot be both a conservative and a revolutionary. One cannot aim at a radical political change while, at the same time, be willing to accept the constraints of traditions and (to some extent at least) the existing political realities of the day. Yet, the aim of this article is not to resolve these inconsistencies, but rather to identify the conflicting imperatives, which endowed the events of 1989 in Central Europe with their unique character. Similarly, no sensible political actor can hope to eliminate all contradictions from political life. In fact, the relative success of reluctant revolutionaries may have been partly due to their realisations of their own limits. 4 This realisation was reflected in the employed strategies: the concept of selflimiting revolutions; the ideal of 'anti-politics' and of an ethical civil society; and the idea of combining the pursuit of ambitious future oriented goals with a reverence to (some aspects of ) the past.
A precautionary note is in order here: clearly, a number of substantive conservative ideals cherished by Burke 6 This distinction makes it possible to characterise the leading dissidents in Central Europe as reluctant, or even 'conservative revolutionaries'. Even though people like Václav Havel, György Konrád and Adam Michnik 7 differed a great deal amongst themselves, and in relation to Burke, with respect to their substantive political commitments, they shared "a distinctive view of the methods appropriate to politics." 8 In line with this, I would see the militant counter-revolutionary pose that Burke adopted towards the end of his life as a betrayal of one of his guiding principles: the idea that dogmatic ideological thinking had to be rejected in any form. At any rate, the term conservative employed in this article is not to be confused with a dogmatic position based on a set of doctrines that amount to conservative ideology. The rejection of Jacobinism must go hand in hand with the rejection of ideologies.
Hence, the dilemma that Burke and his followers had to confront was how to fight against Jacobinism without resorting to the very same Jacobin tendencies they opposed. manifesto of a counter-revolution" as early as 1791. 10 It can be argued that Burke's criticism of the destructive tendencies in the French Revolution was even more applicable to Marxism and the series of communist revolutions, which started with the October Revolution in 1917.
11 Hence, the defeat of communism in 1989 could be simply seen as amounting to the unmaking of 1917. In line with this, the controversial German historian, Ernst Nolte, interpreted the 1989 revolutions as attempts to negate the destruction of 1917 (which brought about the total destruction of bourgeoisie) by the 'restoration' of liberal democracy. Not surprisingly, Nolte also reads these events as the final confirmation of his 'grand theory' of twentieth century history. 1989 marks the end of the 'Weltbürgerkrieg', that is the world civil war-the term Nolte coined for the description of the cold war. World civil war was, according to Nolte, the logical continuation of the European civil war 1917-1945, which was characterised by the violent struggle of two competing ideologies and political regimes, that of Nazism and Communism.
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The problem with this kind of militant anti-communism is that it displays Jacobin tendencies that may be characteristic of many contemporary political movements on the Right, but are far removed from the thinking of those Central European dissidents who prevailed in 1989 (their anti-communism was anything but militant!). In fact, it is worth remembering that the Nazis were militant anti-communists, who also saw the French Revolution as anticipating the Bolshevik revolutions. Theirs was a 'conservative revolution' openly directed against the universal liberal values of the French Revolution.
Militant anti-communism can be thus brought close to Goebbels who commented after the Nazi takeover in 1933: "With a stroke we have now obliterated 1789 from the history books." 13 Clearly, the reluctant revolutionaries of 1989 were conservative in radically different ways, not least because they actually endorsed the enlightened values (partly) inherited from the French Revolution, while they remained committed to the rejection of violence in political struggle.
Strange Revolutions/Strange Revolutionaries

14
The revolutions of 1989 do not fit easily into any preconceived notion of revolutionary change in Europe. These were self-limiting revolutions in which there was very little, or no violence; no radical break with the past; and very little or no revenge towards those who were responsible for the injustices of the old regime. In direct opposition to the revolutionary regime change orchestrated by the communists after the Second World War, the revolutions of 1989 were marked by constraint, not radicalism. They were, as Gale Stokes astutely observed, "revolutionary in the negative sense that they interred any realistic hope that the teleological experiment in the use of human reason to transform society in its entirety might succeed." 15 In this way, they undermined the credibility of the revolutionary tradition usually traced back to the French Revolution, which was driven by the belief that radically new ideas would give rise to radically improved societies.
By any standards, the dissident intellectuals in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, who were catapulted into the position of leaders of these revolutions, were very unlikely revolutionaries. The likes of Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia, Adam Michnik in Poland and György Konrád in Hungary saw their struggle against the omnipotent communist state as an 'anti-political' struggle for authenticity, not a fight for political power. In line with this, they were reluctant to ally themselves with clearly defined ideological positions. Instead they appealed to a set of basic human values, assuming that a regime built on hypocrisy, greed and conformism could be defeated by truthfulness and a sense of basic human decency (hence Havel's notion of the "living in truth"). 16 
and Theories of Modernisation
These ideas may have been noble, but to many western observers they seemed antiquated and unsuitable as a basis for a coherent and clearly formulated political program. In line with this, dissident intellectuals and their ideas were not at the centre of scholarly attention before and (not even) after the collapse of communism. 17 The disregard of western scholars towards intellectual developments amongst dissident intellectuals in Central and Eastern Europe was even easier to justify after the collapse of communism. There was not much to study, so the argument went, given the fact that the 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe did not bring about any new ideas. Jürgen Habermas, for example, identified as early as in 1990 "a peculiar characteristic of this revolution, namely its total lack of ideas that are either innovative or oriented towards the future." 18 According to Claus Offe, this was also the reason why the prospects for the success of the postcommunist transition were rather slim. In a situation in which "the negative coalitions of dissidents and citizens' movements had no coherent political and economic project on their own," 19 there was little hope for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to master the multiple challenges of economic and political transformation. It was Offe who coined the memorable phrase of the "tunnel at the end of the light," which best captured the pessimistic predictions of many political theorists at the time. 20 We know now that most of those gloomy predictions did not materialise. The countries of Central Europe did not relapse to old, or new forms of despotism. It is worth remembering, however, that immediately after 1989 it would have been prudent to expect that the revolutions would turn nasty, and that people would end up supporting some kind of authoritarian regimes. The challenges ahead were indeed formidable, and it was by no means inevitable, for example, that the eruption of violence fuelled by extreme nationalism was limited to the Balkans. Yet, no similar developments took place in the countries of Central Europe. This is not to suggest that this process is irreversible, or that there are no challenges ahead-far from it. But I think that it is fair to say that despite many difficulties and significant current challenges, all the countries of Central Europe have developed remarkably stable political regimes, in which "liberal democracy is the only game in town." 21 Historically speaking the failure of the revolutions would not have been unusual-it is their success that is remarkable and calls for explanation. As Hannah Arendt noted "it is perfectly true and a sad fact indeed, that most so-called revolutions, far from achieving constitutio libertatis, have not even been able to produce constitutional guarantees of civil rights and liberties, the blessings of 'limited government.'" 22 Contrary to Offe's assumptions, I will argue (relying on Arendt and Burke) that the key to understanding the success of the 1989 Revolutions in Central Europe was their lack of radically new ideas. It was precisely because these revolutions were unoriginal and backward-looking that they were also largely successful. brings Europe to maturity. In this account, the path of European civilisation towards ever-greater progress was merely interrupted by the tragic accidents of Nazism and communism. Typical is the assessment by Francois Furet, who believed that the revolutions of 1989 imbued the famous principles of 1789 with a certain freshness and with renewed universality. As we begin to close the long and tragic digression that was the Communist illusion, we find ourselves more than ever confronted by the great dilemmas of democracy as they appeared at the end of the 18th century, expressed by ideas and by the course of the French Revolution.
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Furet's view is not without justification and it resonates with the views of some of the actors of the revolutions in 1989. György Konrád, for example, noted that their timing was "an edifying coincidence, one might say: an homage, at a remove of two hundred years, to the revolution that first proclaimed the civil rights of the individual." 25 In fact, the most popular slogan of these revolutions, "the return to Europe," could be seen as the invocation of those principles that are usually associated with the heritage of the French Revolution: the ideals of freedom, equality and solidarity. In a similar vein, Boris Kapustin critiques the reductionism of modernisation theories for their tendency to assume that there is "an uncompromising opposition between 'tradition,' or better, 'traditionalism,' and 'modernity. '" 33 However, the attempts to replace modernisation theories with suitably adjusted theories of postmodernity are themselves not without limitations. Ironically, these theories still rely (if only implicitly) on the crude temporal logic that divides history into pre-modern, modern and post-modern times. As Johann P. Arnason reminds us, "visions of an existing or emerging postmodernity are always based on oversimplified images of modernity." 34 Hence the terms borrowed from post-modern discourse tend to obscure rather than clarify the political developments in the countries of the former Eastern bloc. 35 At any rate, the talk about 'post-communism-as-postmodernity', or 'post-communism as post-revolutionism', adds little to our understanding of its problems (let alone helping the actors to deal with them).
as Self-limiting Conservative Revolutions
Rejecting various 'postist' labels and their pretensions, 36 I want to suggest a simpler conceptual framework that should allow us to evaluate the meaning One does not need to adopt a postmodern idiom to argue (as Kapustin did) that it is unhelpful to postulate an unbridgeable gap between the political program of modernity and tradition. As David Gress demonstrated in a recent historic survey, the emergence of modernity and the concomitant rise of the West should not be seen as marking a radical break in human history (which can be conveniently dated with the French Revolution), but rather a result of long-lasting historic developments that should be traced back to its Greek, Latin and Christian origins. Gress challenges the myth of a sudden appearance of freedom in the western world and guards against the influence of the philosophical program of radical enlightenment (Rousseau). According to Gress, the political, social and economic phenomenon of modern liberty was made possible by the synthesis of the heritage of the Old West with the political values that came to be equated with the New West. 37 This is clearly We ought to see what it will please them to do before we risque congratulations, which may be soon turned into complaints. 40 Burke's reluctance to congratulate the French people on the attainment of liberty was vindicated once the revolution descended into a more violent phase.
The guillotine and the reign of terror under Robespierre, in Burke's view, were not just an aberration marking the betrayal of the initial ideals of the revolution, but a direct consequence of attempts at the implementation of those very same radical ideas. This is not to say that the descent to anarchy and the concomitant increase in political violence were inevitable, but rather that certain radical ideals can pave ground for these developments. This lesson was well understood by the dissident leaders in Central Europe who were vehemently opposed to the use of violence. Consider Michnik's comments about the virtues of democracy:
Democracy is not identical to freedom. Democracy is freedom written into the rule of law. Freedom in itself, without the limits imposed on it by law and tradition, is a road to anarchy and chaos-where the right of the strongest rules. 41 Michnik's view echoes Burke, and is representative of the conscious effort of the reluctant revolutionaries to lay the ground for liberty under the rule of law.
An Alternative Paradigm of Revolutionary Change: 1688 and 1776 not 1789
In fact, even Burke himself can be seen as a defender of the ideals of liberty (if not equality), and a certain kind of revolutionary change, which he saw best embodied in the Glorious Revolution in Britain of 1688. As the full title of Burke's seminal work indicates, there was another dimension to his critic of the French Revolution often neglected in the discussions about modern revolutions, which was his concern with the protection of the legacies of revolution in Britain. 42 Hence, Burke's key insights can also help in understanding the unique nature of 1989 by providing alternative points of reference, such as the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the American Revolution of 1776.
Burke's account of the revolution of 1688 that focuses on the attempt to preserve "antient indisputable laws and liberties," 43 can be related to the notion of a "return to normality" in the countries of Central Europe. When Czechs, Poles, Slovaks and Hungarians shed their oppressive regimes, they believed (rightly or wrongly) that they were simply reclaiming their ancient liberties.
Hence, it was crucially important for the success of the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe that the universal liberal ideals were 'translated' into domestic nationalist discourses at the theoretical level, 44 and into national constitutions and the emerging legal orders at the practical level. In this context, it is telling that the first president of the Hungarian constitutional court, László Sólyom, was able to justify a number of controversial decisions by referring to the existing "invisible constitution," as well as "the history of constitutional Freedom was the most precious inheritance that the Americans gained from Britain:
We cannot, I fear, falsify the pedigree of this fierce people, and persuade them that they are not sprung from a nation, in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates. The language in which they would hear you tell them this tale, would detect the imposition; your speech would betray you. An Englishman is the unfittest person on earth to argue another Englishman into slavery. 48 To do justice to Burke, it is important to acknowledge other differences between the French and the American Revolutions, which make the latter look more like the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe. Whatever is suggested in Thomas Jefferson's ambitious rhetoric in the Declaration of Independence, the goals of the American Revolution were always more moderate than the goals of the French Revolution. They were tempered by the concern of its leaders to avoid a descent into anarchy; to ensure stability and order in the new republic. As Irving Kristol observed (relying largely on Arendt's interpretation), "all revolutions unleash tides of passion, and the American Revolution was no exception. But it was exceptional in the degree to which it was able to subordinate these passions to serious and nuanced thinking about fundamental problems of political philosophy." 49 This is the reason why Burke was able to endorse the American Revolution and oppose the French one later without being inconsistent. once the revolution had been completed. The greatest challenge was how to keep alive the revolutionary spirit without suffering the consequences of revolutionary instability. Yet, according to Arendt, the American Revolution was more successful than its French counterpart in opening up new opportunities for citizens to become actively involved in politics as equals under the rule of law, because it managed to keep the balance between two conflicting elements: "the concern with stability and the spirit of the new." 55 By focusing on political liberty rather than the issues of social equality, the American Revolution created public space for authentic political engagement. As Winfried Thaa forcefully demonstrated, the revolutions of 1989 can be seen as late vindications of Arendt's attempt to challenge the dominant concept of revolution in Europe with a "concept of revolution that does not seek the radical overthrow of the societal order, but rather, orientated on the American model, aims primarily at a renewal of the political space." 56 Another aspect of the French Revolution, which was not echoed in 1989, was its adverse relation to religion. In fact, the hostility of the French enlightenment to religion, which Burke abhorred, can be contrasted with the importance of religious sentiments that fed into the revolutions of 1989. This also brings it closer to the American model that was "based on a political ideology transformed from a religious experience but maintaining its religious orientations." 57 
Spiritual Grounding of Liberal Democracy
The most obvious example to illustrate this is, of course, Poland, where the role of the Catholic Church was not just contingent on the fact that it was the only institution that was relatively independent of the state (though this was undoubtedly an important factor too). There were also some profound philosophical reasons why the fight for liberty was seen in alliance with the fight for authentic religious faith. As the prominent Polish historian of Solidarity, Jan Józef Lipski clearly demonstrated, the movement was strongly influenced by a Christian ethos, which even a large majority of the non-religious members adopted as their own. This attitude was described by Jacek Kuroñ in an essay with a revealing title: "A Christian Without God." 58 In Slovakia too, the 'Velvet Revolution' in 1989 was anticipated by large religious demonstrations in the summer of 1988, which had both openly politi-cal as well as spiritual dimensions. Even in the Czech Republic, which is characterised by a thoroughly secular society, the defence of human rights was voiced in almost religious language. Consider Patoçka's statement about the importance of human rights, which was published in a key document of Charter 77:
No society, no matter how well-equipped it may be technologically, can function without a moral foundation, without convictions that do not depend on convenience, circumstances, or expected advantage. . . . The idea of human rights is nothing other than the conviction that even states, even society as a whole, are subject to the sovereignty of moral sentiment: that they recognise something unconditional that is higher than they are, something that is binding even on them, sacred, inviolable . . . 59 So, even Patoçka, while remaining truthful to phenomenology and its antifoundationalist philosophical position, sought to ground the idea of human rights in "something unconditional." Following in his steps, Havel repeatedly stressed the importance of morality in politics; he talked about higher responsibility that he sought to justify with a reference to some higher entity:
whether it be God, "the chain of being," "the voice of being," 60 or any other metaphysical concept. 61 While these philosophical positions may not warrant Derrida's reading of Patoçka as "a fundamentally Christian thinker," 62 let alone aeiΩek's attack on Havel for his alleged "religious fundamentalism," 63 it is clear that both Patoçka and Havel were not dogmatically opposed to Christianity and recognised it as an in important (though not the only) resource for moral deliberations. Havel also repeatedly raised concerns about the destructive potential of the more ambitious and radical aspects of enlightenment, which gave rise to ideological frameworks, or in Burke's terminology "abstract designs." Europe were possible as long as the Soviet Union was determined to maintain its control over its satellite states. Yet, the actions of the reluctant revolutionaries in Central Europe were guided not only by these pragmatic considerations. Equally, or even more important, was their conviction that they had to exercise constraint in their own political struggle in order to prevent "the very negative experiences of all unlimited social revolutions of the Jacobin-Bolshevik type." 65 They were also convinced that the 'post-totalitarian' communist regimes could have been challenged from within by peaceful means, if only enough people were determined to defy it. This was the reasoning behind Havel's seminal essay "The Power of the Powerless," in which he rejected the use of violence inspired by dogmatic ideologies:
'dissidents' tend to be sceptical about political thought based on the faith that profound social changes can only be achieved by bringing about (regardless of the method) changes in the system or in the government, and the belief that such changes-because they are considered 'fundamental'-justify the sacrifice of 'less fundamental' things, in other words human lives.
Respect for a theoretical concept here outweighs respect for human life. Yet this is precisely what threatens to enslave humanity all over again. 66 Michnik was even more direct in rejecting the ideal of revolutionary violence associated with the French Revolution: "to believe in overthrowing the dictatorship of the party by revolution is both unrealistic and dangerous," he argued, because "those who use force to storm present-day Bastilles are likely to build bigger and worse Bastilles." 67 Consequently, the opposition leaders were willing to constrain themselves in their exercise of power even after the actual collapse of communism. They made considerable efforts to maintain "the fiction of legal continuity with a past without legality." 68 As Arato commented, this is one of the remarkable legacies of 1989. "It is the great contribution of the Central and East European struggle for legality in the midst of radical transformation that, even without inherited republican institutions, the new can be built without total rupture with the past." 69 The anti-communist revolutionaries were prepared to make deals with their former communist foes, because they feared that the alternative would have brought about a descent to chaos and anarchy. These actors "were trying at all times to promote a revolution without a revolution." suggesting that one could usefully relate this instigation to dialogue to the Habermasian concept of a "communicative ethics," 73 but there can be little doubt that they constituted an attempt to reclaim the public sphere as a space for genuine political engagement. In this sense, one can also talk about "a return to normality," 74 in which the lives of citizens were no longer to be determined by the bureaucratic monopoly of the communist party, but rather by an open-ended contest between different societal actors.
'Return to Normality'
The notion of a 'return to normality' may have been very ambiguous, 75 but it found resonance with a vast majority of the people. Many Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians simply desired to restore a sense of normality after the 'foolish experiment' of communism. The fact that this 'normality' was equated with securing life-styles that were thought characteristic of the wellestablished democracies in the West, and was hence quite removed from any present or past experiences of the peoples in Central Europe, did not prevent
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As the Polish sociologist Jerzy Jedlicki wryly remarked, Poland has always been returning to Europe, although it has actually never been there. 76 Yet, it is precisely thanks to this perception, that it was possible for the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians to see their fight for liberty as being in line with the best aspects of their own national traditions. 77 In this way, the notion of a return to normality linked the project of postcommunist transition, which was oriented towards a liberal-democratic future, with the pre-communist past.
However, not only the pre-communist past served as a point of reference for the evaluation of liberal values. The new leaders also sought to rally people in support of liberal values by recalling their failed revolts against communism. This return to the best aspects of dissident past(s) was obviously in conflict with the second aspect of self-limiting conservative revolutions, the effort to maintain the fiction of legal continuity with the illegal and illegitimate communist regime. Clearly, these were contradictory impulses: one could not 'preserve' pasts, which were so radically different and even mutually exclusive. Yet, it was done even when it led to grotesque occurrences. It suffices to recall that Václav Havel, who as a leader of Charter 77 was thoroughly despised by the communists, was voted into the presidency of 78 these enlightened concepts were generally seen as too radical, and dangerous for liberty. However, two hundred years after the French Revolution the ideals of the French revolutionaries themselves became a part of a European, or Western tradition, 79 and most people today would not think of democracy and liberty as inherently incompatible.
Similarly, the ideal of universal human rights, which was vehemently opposed by Burke as far too radical and dangerous, has become a powerful source of inspiration for people with vastly different backgrounds; the discourse of human rights today cuts across all ideological boundaries. It is worth remembering, however, that this is a result of a relatively recent development (from Helsinki 1975 to Charter 1977 to the notion of 'human rights wars' in Kosovo and Iraq), in which Central and East European intellectuals played a crucial role. Even Arendt subscribed to Burke's views on human rights as late as in the 1960s. As she put it, "the perplexities of the Rights of Man are manifold, and Burke's famous argument against them is neither obsolete nor 'reactionary.'" 80 Like Burke, Arendt believed that the ideal of universal human rights is far too ambitious to be useful in practical politics.
81 Like Burke, she was convinced that people only acquire rights through belonging to a particular political community, one which is capable and willing of enforcing them: "We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights." 
Anti-Politics and Civil Society
Due to the recent popularity of the concept of civil society, which transcends ideological boundaries, it may be easily forgotten that the concept was originally based on a rather conservative ideal-the conviction that free societies rely on private virtues. Good character and virtue, according to Burke, cannot be developed as a result of an abstract ideal of humanity. They can only be fostered within a relatively small community of citizens here and now; within the 'little platoons', in which everyone knows their place (moving in expanding concentric circles from your family to your neighbourhood, from your neighbourhood to your city, from your city to your nation and the wider world). One does not become virtuous simply by understanding and accepting the wisdom of Rousseau's 'General Will', or the Kantian 'categorical imperative'. Similarly, for Hannah Arendt, there is not much use in invoking the noble principles of liberty, unless the kind of political space is (re-)created in society, in which authentic actions of independent citizens can take place. Burke's own personal example showed that this is not to say that one should limit one's moral concerns to one's own small community. But the starting point must be your concern with the individuals here and now. As Burke put it:
I have no great opinion of that sublime abstract, metaphysic reversionary, contingent humanity, which in cold blood can subject the present time and
The Paradoxes of the Revolutions of 1989 in Central Europe • 379 those whom we daily see and converse with to immediate calamities in favour of the future and uncertain benefit of persons who only exist in idea. 83 Once again, this kind of reasoning resonates with the convictions of dissident intellectuals (for example, Havel, Michnik, Konrád), who strongly believed that only through changing the 'hearts and minds' of individual members of society could communism be defeated, and later the process of postcommunist transition succeed. This is why Havel repeatedly stressed that one must turn away from "abstract political visions of the future and toward concrete human beings and ways of defending them effectively in the here and now." 84 Hence, any genuine political engagement had to be a result of taking concrete responsibility. This was the ideal of an ethical civil society.
In its initial form, the concept of civil society was not meant to be revolutionary; civil society was not seen as directed against the state, but was supposed to complement it. That was the vision inherited "from Locke, the Scottish Enlightenment, Burke, Hegel, and de Tocqueville." 85 As one of the leading Hungarian intellectuals, G.M. Tamás, explained, the dissidents in Central Europe appropriated this concept creatively for their own purposes and turned it against the oppressive communist state. This antagonism between state and society is reminiscent more of Thomas Paine than Burke, and it is not surprising, hence, that the Central European concept of civil society had strong appeal to the left-wing intellectuals in the West. 86 It was Paine who asserted in Common Sense that "society is in every state a blessing, but government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil." 87 The dissident's suspicion of the communist state and its official ideology, Marxism, found its expression in the idea of anti-politics. Anti-politics was directed not only against the state, but any institutionalised politics, and was hostile not only towards Marxism, but any (dogmatic) political ideology in general. However, it would be a crude misunderstanding to see the ideal of anti-politics as apolitical. On the contrary, by liberating individuals from the constraints of institutional politics and the schematic thinking imposed by abstract ideological frameworks, individuals were empowered to endow their actions with authentic meaning: in this sense personal became political. The ideal of anti-politics urged people to act "as if" they were free, 88 and to assume responsibility that comes with freedom. Hence, anti-politics was not a politics without principles, rather simply a "politics without cliché." 89 In fact, if there is one distinct contribution from the intellectuals from Central and Eastern Europe to political theory in general, it is to be found in their conviction that "the old categories of ideological contestation have become hopelessly clichéd: they refer only to themselves in tendentious circles of selfreferentiality." 90 While many intellectuals in the West seem still indebted to these ideological frameworks (even when intent on overcoming them), 91 most intellectuals in Central Europe abandoned them. However, even though this 'post-ideological' position rejects all great narratives it would be a mistake to label it as post-modern (especially if postmodernism implies moral relativism). As I have argued, it is much closer to the thinking of the likes of Burke, who identified the dangers of schematic ideological thinking well before it became one of the dominant features of modernity. Arendt shared this suspicion of ideologies, which have the tendency to neatly divide the political world into binary oppositions. This is reflected in her critique of conventional theories of revolution, which underpin the argument about the selflimiting conservative revolutions of 1989 advanced in this article. In her view, "the very fact that these two elements [which were contained in the spirit of revolution], the concern with stability and the spirit of the new, have become opposites in political thought and terminology-the one being identified as conservatism and the other being claimed as the monopoly of progressive liberalism-must be recognized to be among the symptoms of our loss." 92 Hence, following Arendt, the legacy of the revolutions of 1989 in Central Europe can be seen as an invitation to rethink the relationship between the ongoing concern with political stability and the desire for a radical renewal.
Concluding Remarks
The attempts of Central European dissidents to reclaim the sphere of politics as a place for human authenticity resulted in their rejection of ideologies.
Leszek Koπakowski offered a witty justification of this approach in the late 1970s. He proposed the establishment of a Conservative-Liberal Socialist International, which was based on the assumption that the differences between the sensible parts of these ideologies were not insurmountable. Thus, their
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The goals of these conservative revolutionaries were both modest and ambitious. They were modest, because they did not openly seek political power, ambitious because they aimed at a redefinition of political space and activities within it. It may be questioned as to how successful these revolutions were in delivering those more ambitious goals. As Arendt reminds us, to sustain the spirit of the revolution after the event is very difficult, if not impossible. However, the attempts of the reluctant revolutionaries to reclaim the sphere of politics as a place for human authenticity must be seen, like democ- Krygier, "Conservative-Liberal-Socialism," p. 7. 
